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I. Introduction
The concept of the self is one which is at once puzzling, as well as vastly important in the
most personal sense to the experiences we undergo as human beings as well as the way we
receive and process sensory information from the external world. Selfhood, or the idea of an
existent self seems inseparable from our existence in both a profoundly abstract and scientifically
concrete sense. In the 17th century Descartes posited mind body dualism to explain the existence
of the self, giving birth to the infamous concept of something akin to a “ghost in the machine”.
Descartes, Locke, and other contemporaries created this concept by positing the self as a sort of
immaterial soul which resides in or above the body, and by means of some mysterious form of
communication, controls the body much in the way a puppet master would control her dolls. This
vision of the self as an immaterial substance which is something more than just the physical body
is one which has strong intuitive pull. The idea that we cannot simply be boiled down to
randomly firing neurotransmitters conforms to the strong intuition held by most that what it
means to be me, or have a self, is something which is a great deal more profound than the
physical capabilities of my body. This intuition is brought out famously by the philosopher John
Locke in the scenario known as the “Prince and the Cobbler.” In this scenario there exist a prince
and a cobbler who undergo a brain swap scenario in which the entire psychologies of the prince
and the cobbler are swapped. Suppose that pervious to the swap, the prince committed a heinous
crime; also suppose that the prince knew that the swap was going to occur, and planned to use the
swap to evade prosecution. When the guards arrive to take the prince to jail, they take away the
princes body, despite the fact that “the person” who is inside the prince is actually the
psychology of the cobbler. When we evaluate our intuitions concerning this scenario it seems as
though there has been a gross miscarriage of justice, the “person” who should be punished is the
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scheming individual who now resides in the body of the cobbler, as that is the consciousness that
knowingly committed the crime. As such, as is illustrated by the manipulation of our sense of
morality concerning the “perpetrator” of the crime in the scenario described above, it seems as
though there is a great deal more to the self than the mere physical body. However, the idea of
the self as something immaterial which communicates directly, (by some unknown sense) with a
physical body located squarely in space and time, seems distinctly unscientific, is not (and
perhaps never could be) empirically verifiable, nor is it observable in any sense. These
shortcomings make mind-body dualism a theory which is easily dismissed as implausible due to
a lack of any sort of scientific foundation.
The idea of an existent self however, is not constrained to the realm of mind body
dualism, and it is not only in an abstract sense that we form an idea of ourselves. As Dennett
points out in his “Origin of Selves” (Dennett, 1989) there is an inherently recognizable
distinction between “the self” and “the other” which is a deeply rooted biological principle. This
principle is so central to our existence and the existence of the other creatures with which we
share this earth, that it is an implicitly foundational principle to evolutionary theory. Specifically,
in order to ensure our survival, (leading to the survival of species) there must be some boundary
between the self and the other so that we may act according to self preservation, ensuring our
survival, and the survival of our genes through reproduction. Put more simply, we must be able
to make the distinction between “us and them,” the internal and the external, if we are to make it
very far in the race for survival. Again, here we have a way of classifying the self, which
includes some of our intuitions, (namely that the idea of self ought to have some empirically
scientific roots, and answer some of our questions about why exactly the idea of self is so
essentially important to human experience) but again falls short in that it seems there is
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something profound about the self or “what it means to be me” that goes beyond the skeleton of
strictly scientific theory.
As we can see, it seems clear that selfhood plays an integral role our concept of human
experience, in both a profoundly abstract as well as foundationally concrete sense. It will be a
goal of this paper however, to argue that the age old epistemological pursuit of “what it means”
to have a persistent self is ultimately unimportant; and that there may not be (strictly speaking)
any fact of the matter about whether selves exist or not. Further, this paper will take for granted
that which has been assumed by Derek Parfit concerning the self as a persistent being1and work
within this framework to address the important questions of what it means to have a self at any
one temporal moment; as well as whether it is possible to have a singular self which persists
through time. It will be the aim of this paper to argue that these two questions are inextricably
linked, and that the answer to one entails the solution to the other, namely that the reality of
selfhood (at any given moment in time) ensures that a “persistent self” is an impossibility.
At first glance, it may seem that to claim that there may be no fact of the matter about
whether selves exist or not, is one which is nothing short of absurd, however it will be the goal of
this paper to convince the reader that this is indeed the case. I do not wish to make the claim the
vision or idea of the self does not matter, but rather that there is no profound truth about whether
selves exist factually. It is instead it is the appearance of selves which is of importance in the
debate surrounding selfhood. I will argue that past the surface of appearances, there is no deep
fact of the matter concerning the self nor is it particularly metaphysically interesting to engage in
the conversation of whether selves exist in factual reality.
In order to illustrate my point to the fullest extent it is helpful to consider a distinction

1

See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapters 10-13, p.199-306.
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between the immediate world of experience, and the possibility of the existence of a removed
metaphysical world containing the realities of things in themselves. Specifically, the immediate
world can be supposed to contain all objects of experience, (objects, events, subjective
experiences) which we experience through the veil of our subjective sensibilities and intuitions.
Contrarily, the metaphysical world can be imagined to contain “things in themselves” or the
metaphysical realities of the way things are, sans our human perceptions of the events in
question. It is my claim that the objective truth about whether or not there are “selves” falls into
the realm of something akin to the metaphysical world described above. Specifically, because of
the realities and limitations of our brains there is an insurmountable epistemological gap between
the so called “reality of selfhood” and the appearance of selfhood we all have. In short, we will
never be able to turn an objective eye to what selfhood entails because we simply cannot get past
the subjective veil of our own selfhood to do so. However, as it turns out, rather than some
objective truth, it is the appearance of the self we all develop which is of metaphysical
importance. This is of the central role our vision of selfhood plays in the way we experience the
world, the way we process external information, and the way it affects the formation of our
desires, intentions and subsequent actions. Therefore the following sections of this paper will
attempt an examination of the central tenets of the universal picture of selfhood, and further
show why investigating the appearance of the self is a metaphysically worthwhile pursuit.
II. Unity of Consciousness
Although there are many aspects of selfhood that may be considered foundational to our
idea of the self, for the purposes of the present paper, a focus will be maintained upon the socalled “unity of consciousness” that many of us consider to be at the center of our vision of the
self. The theory of unity of consciousness attempts to explain the sense of unity we have
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concerning our conscious mental states, as well as our sense of ownership over our mental states.
Take the example of my first college class: during my first college class I enjoyed many different
phenomenal states; specifically I entertained the visual experiences of eagerly examining my
fellow classmates, registering the professor at the front of the room, and taking in the details of
how the classroom appeared to me. During this time I simultaneously experienced auditory
sensations such as those of listening to my professor giving her class lecture, listening to the
comments of my classmates, and so on. Finally, also during this time, I experienced emotional
and cognitive sensations of various kinds, such as thinking critically about what the professor
was saying, feeling excitement and anxiety about being in my first college class, as well as a
deep awareness of my sense of self and of how I was presenting myself to my peers—I wanted to
come off as smart and intelligent without being pretentious or conceited, quick witted without
being the class clown, and so on and so forth. Through this description of my first college class,
one can begin to understand what unity of consciousness entails: the unity of all of my
simultaneous experiences rolled into one subjective experience: that of my first college class.
Timothy Bayne (Bayne, 2008) famously described phenomenal unity of consciousness as
the experience of “what it is like” to be me. We can see how unity of consciousness is necessary
for understanding our subjective experiences as well as the subjective experiences of others
because unity of consciousness consolidates our experiences in such a way that there is
something it would “be like” to have them. Another way of thinking about unity of
consciousness, concerns the sense of ownership we have over our subjective experiences. The
experience of my first college class is something I share with no one, it is entirely and completely
mine because there is only one “me” or one mind which underwent the actual experience of my
first college class, there are not two or three other “selves” which have had parts of the
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experience of my first college class but rather just the one “me” who has. Despite the seemingly
obvious nature concerning ownership of our mental states, this ownership has been contested
several times in debates concerning unity of consciousness.
If there were no exceptions to the rule of singly unified ownership over our subjective
experiences then we could happily conclude that what matters in the debate about selfhood
concerns whether the subject is able to entertain phenomenally unified personal experiences and
leave it at that. However there has been great debate since the early 1970’s about whether or not
our vision of the self as a unified consciousness is actually coherent. This debate often centers
around neuropsychological discoveries concerning bi-hemispheric communication between the
right and left hemispheres in the brain, and the strange psychological phenomena that occurs
when the corpus callosum is severed. During the 1960’s brain bisection operations were
sometimes performed as a last ditch effort to attempt to control the seizures of severely epileptic
patients. In brain bisection operations the corpus callosum, (a strand of neurons which connects
the right and left hemispheres allowing for communication within the brain) is cut, the goal being
to stop epileptic seizures from spreading from the left to the right (or vice versa) lobes of the
brain. For a long time it was assumed that these operations had no effect on the patient other than
effects desired due to the fact that patients would continue their normal lives exhibiting no signs
of impaired functioning. However sometime later, experiments done using brain bisected
patients told a somewhat different story, leading psychologists and philosophers to speak of a
“dual consciousness” in brain bisected patients. The facts concerning brain functioning are as
follows: the left hemisphere is associated with the right side of the body, while the right
hemisphere is associated with the left side, as such tactile stimuli and sensations are transmitted
contralaterally. Visual stimuli are also transmitted contralaterally in that the left half of each
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retina (which scans the right half of each visual field) sends information to the left hemisphere,
while the right half of each retina, (scanning the left half of the visual field) sends information to
the right hemisphere. Further, the left hemisphere is associated with the control and production
of speech. Laboratory experiments making use of such knowledge concerning brain functioning
have been conducted on split brain patients with surprising results. These results are summarized
by Nagel (Nagel, 1971) in his paper “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness” and are as
follows: in brain bisected patients,
“What is flashed to the right half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the right hand can be reported
verbally. What is flashed to the left half of the visual field, or felt unseen by the left hand cannot be
reported verbally. However, if the word “hat” is flashed on the left the left hand will retrieve a hat from a
group of concealed objects if the person is told to pick out what he has seen. At the same time he will
insist verbally that he saw nothing” (Nagel, 1971, p. 400).

This strange behavior seems to indicate a dual consciousness, or the development of 2
separate consciousnesses residing inside a single body, immediately raising concerns about the
extent to which we can confidently attribute a single countable mind to such patients. Indeed,
such experiments have lead some philosophers to question whether unity of consciousness is
something we can confidently attribute even to normal individuals due to the fact that it seems
highly unlikely that experimental conditions can elicit (from an otherwise normally functioning
individual) a new consciousness to spring into existence and then equally quickly disappear once
the individual goes back to daily life. Indeed, the results from such experiments make it seem
rather more likely that we have made an error in assuming that “the self” we all have is a single
unified global consciousness which subsumes all of our mental states creating a larger cohesive
unit.
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However, there is something distinctly disconcerting about the idea of sharing our body
with multiple “selves” or unities of consciousness, and there is a strong intuitive pull towards any
viewpoint which posits only one “self” operating at a time, certainly this is what it feels like is
going on. Indeed to refer to the point made by Timothy Bayne, it does not seem as though there
is anything it would “be like” to share one’s body with multiple competing selves which operate
simultaneously. Therefore, how do we reconcile the appearance of selfhood with the logical
inconsistencies raised by such problems as brain bisection or other strange psychological
phenomena? I will defend make the claim that something akin to the successive selves theory
described by Parfit in his book “Reasons and Persons” (Parfit, 1984) is the closest we can hope
to come to explaining the appearance of the self. Not only does the successive selves theory
provide a coherent response to the logical problem raised by brain bisection experiments, it also
provides a coherent answer to the puzzling question of how we manage to stay the same person
over time even though quite literally everything about us changes.
III. Successive Selves
The version of the successive self view I wish to defend plays out as follows: with every
change in mental state, sensory input, or cognitive processing, the “self” we identify with as a
person changes, in this way each cohesive self (all possessing an instantaneous unity of
consciousness) passes out of existence as quickly as each “new” self comes into being to replace
the previous self. In short, every moment (conscious or unconscious) long enough for us to
formulate an awareness of our existence is presided over by a selfhood, one which is replaced by
a new selfhood the next instant. Each of these successive selves has as much claim to “who we
are” as the previous, but is the most relevant to our idea of selfhood in the moment in which each
self is in immediate existence. However, it is not this instantaneous “unity of consciousness”
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which matters in the idea of selfhood, but rather the connection between each successive self.
The connection between selves has to do with a kind of continuity of mental states rather than
simply the continuation of the physical body. However, selves that have passed out of immediate
existence many years ago have a different kind of connection to the currently presiding self than
do those who are passing out of immediate existence as I speak. Here Parfit’s distinction between
psychological continuity and psychological connectedness is helpful. Specifically Parfit states
that psychological connectedness refers to “the holding of particular direct psychological
connections” (Parfit, 1984, p.206) as such psychological connectedness is a transitive relation
and can hold to a matter of degree. This differs from psychological continuity which Parfit
defines as the “holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness” (Parfit, 1984, p. 206).
This distinction is extremely helpful when discussing the relationships between successive selves
because it helps to illustrate their relevance to the self at hand. Specifically, my current self is
psychologically continuous with the immediately previous selves because there is a strong and
overlapping connection between the present and immediately previous selves which orients me
to the continuous and uninterrupted flow of daily life that I am accustomed to. However this
strong relation does not hold between my present self and the self I was at some moment 13
years prior. However, there is some relation there, which allows me to refer to the person I was at
that moment 13 years prior as me. This relation holds because the self I was at some moment 13
years prior is psychologically connected with the present self to some degree by virtue of the
transitivity principle of psychological connection.
Due to the fleeting nature of the “unity of consciousness” that is in charge in each
moment, what actually matters when we discuss selfhood are the various psychological relations
we have to each of our successive selves. When this view is adopted we can explain the

Hanniball, 10

appearance of selfhood solving the puzzling issue of our persistence across time as well as
dealing with brain bi-section. Successive selves provides a solution to the brain bi-section
problem because it shifts the focus away from considering one global and time expansive unity
of consciousness as “the real me” and places emphasis instead on the connections that hold
between successive instantaneous unities, therefore allowing us to attribute the strange
discrepancies that occur in the behavior of brain bisected patients to malfunctioning in the
physical brain rather than a strange “dualility of unified consciousness” or simultaneously
operating selves. Indeed, even further support for this is provided by information gleaned from
some of the laboratory experiments conducted upon split brain patients when the right
hemisphere is faced with a communication problem. Dennett brings our attention to the
resourcefulness of some brain bisected patients in his paper “The Self as a Center of Narrative
Gravity” (Dennett, 1992). Experiments have been conducted where split brain subjects must
reach into a closed bag with the left hand to feel an object which they are then asked to identify
verbally, because of the removal of the communication link between hemispheres, the right
hemisphere gets information about the object from the left hand, but the left hemisphere, (which
controls speech) is kept in the dark, therefore the patient is unable to publicly announce what has
been felt in the bag. However, there is a solution to this communication problem which some
split brain patients have been observed to discover. As quoted by Dennett
“Whereas ordinary tactile sensations are represented contralaterally, pain signals are represented
ipsilaterally (meaning pain sensations go to both hemispheres) suppose the object in the bag is a pencil.
The right hemisphere will sometimes hit upon a very clever tactic: hold the pencil in your left hand so its
point is pressed hard into the palm; this creates pain letting the left hemisphere know there’s something
sharp in the bag, which is enough of a hint that it can begin guessing; the right hemisphere will then
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signal “getting warmer” and “got it” signals by smiling or other controllable signs and in a very short time
the subject will be able to announce the correct answer” (Dennett, 1992).

As such it seems as though these experiments reveal a talent for overcoming accessibility
and communication problems in patients who have impaired brain functioning. When applied to
the theory of successive selves it would seem as though the unified self “in charge” at a
particular moment is experiencing difficulty (due to physical damage) in creating a cohesive
story for the present experiences of the patient at hand. However, due to the resourcefulness of
the brain and our determination to force a unity into our experiences it is possible for the self at
hand (by means of clues and hints given) to combine fragments of a phenomenal experience
together in such a way that allows us to maintain the appearance of unity—much in the same
way we have the appearance of a persistent expansive unified consciousness despite the passing
in and out of existence of successive selves. This is because it is a psychological tendency to
create unity where perhaps no one appears, or to organize our life experiences into a unified
story.
IV. Psychological Tendencies and the “Narrative Self”
The question which now becomes relevant is: why are we so invested in this “unified
story”? As indicated above, it is more likely that what really matters in the appearance of the self
is the relationships between present selves rather than the appearance of a single, expansive
unified consciousness. So why do we find ourselves preoccupied with such a self? I will argue
that there is nothing more to this intuition than a psychological tendency to view ourselves as a
unified, consistent, and pervasive unit which persists through time. However this tendency has
no metaphysical depth other than it is useful for us to think of ourselves in this manner, it helps
us make sense of our lives, develop an idea of who “we really are” and aids in our ability to form
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relationships and communicate with others around us. However the idea of a persistent self is
nothing short of an abstraction which has a psychologically intuitive pull. As seen above,
logically what seems to matter about the appearance of a self is a relationship that connects
“selves” or present mental states; however we don’t necessarily like to think of ourselves in this
way. The reason for our belief in the self as a persistent unity of consciousness has been artfully
illustrated in a useful analogy coined by Dennett (Dennett, 1992). Dennett draws a helpful
parallel between an object’s “center of gravity” and our “narrative selves” which I believe,
allows us to see the true function of the appearance of a persistent self. Specifically, a center of
gravity is a concept of Newtonian physics that has an established place both in the theory and
language of science. It figures into explanations that appear to be causal in nature—“why doesn’t
the lamp fall over?” “Because its center of gravity is so low”—however, a center of gravity
cannot be found anywhere, it occupies no spatio-temporal location, has no physical properties to
speak of, and does not resemble any other physical object in space. Indeed, to try and pinpoint
where exactly an object’s center of gravity is located would be to make a category error, one
would not look at a lamp on a table and ask “but where exactly is its center of gravity?” to do so
would be absurd. In this sense, a center of gravity is like the idea of a conscious and persistent
unified self, it is an abstraction, a fiction or “causal story” used in an offhand way to offer a
coherent explanation for the events of our daily lives, but in reality is a somewhat empty notion.
I propose that this narrative “center of gravity” or self, is constantly changing an updated
version of which is available with every new successive self or change in mental state. In our
daily lives this change is gradual, we do not notice a shift in our “narrative figurehead” from one
moment to the next, however if we look back on who we were five or ten years ago, we find that
there is often a great discrepancy between who we identify with now and who we felt we were
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then. This discrepancy is tangible and can be attributed to the different relationships our
presiding narrative self shares with previous selves. Specifically, as mentioned above, the
relationship between my current “self” and those immediately previous is much stronger than
that which holds between my present self and that of some moment 5 years ago. This is due to
the level of psychological connectedness present between each of the selves in question. The
level of overlap between my current self and those immediately previous is very high, a direct
connection of psychological continuity, however the relationship between myself now and
myself 5 years ago is direct only because such a relationship is transitive, and the level of overlap
is low or nonexistent. Therefore, it is natural that the constant change in my narrative self that
occurs daily seems somewhat seamless, and offers no interruption to daily life.
The claim that our narrative self changes literally from one mental state to the next is not
a weak claim. I am proposing that in a very real sense our vision of what constitutes a self ceases
to exist and is replaced by a new and updated narrative, or to be put more simply, each narrative
self dies and is replaced by a brand new updated self constantly throughout the course of our
lives. As such, a common intuitive reaction to such a proposal is to object to it on the grounds
that we certainly would notice if, rather than being a persistent being, or having a single unified
self which stretches across time, we were instead merely a collection of instantaneous and every
changing narrative figureheads. Certainly, it will be objected, there is a distinct enough
difference between the death of a self, and its continued existence, that each option is describing
profoundly different outcomes. However I will argue that the two options are merely
semantically different ways of describing one and the same outcome, that there is no deep
metaphysical fact of the matter which makes the death of a self or its continued existence, vastly
different scenarios.
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In order to make this claim, it is important to understand that my proposal is reductionist
in that it is my belief that in some scenarios concerning personal identity there may be no
objective fact of the matter about whether a self is existent at a particular moment, or whether it
has ceased to exist. To put it more simply, there may be scenarios involving personal identity
where it makes the most sense to claim that the identity of the thing or “self” in question is
distinctly indeterminate in a most unpuzzling way. It may be hard to understand this type of
abstract claim without the help of a somewhat more concrete example, as such it will be helpful
to consider Parfit’s club example to make the claim more apparent, the scenario is as follows:
“Suppose that a certain club exists for several years, holding regular meetings. The meetings then
cease. Some years later, some of the members of this club form a club with the same name, and
the same rules.” (Parfit, 1984, p. 213).
The question we may ask ourselves concerning the nature of this club is: have these
people reconvened the very same club? Or have they instead formed a new club which is exactly
similar? It is possible that there is some definitive answer to this question, it may be that the club
has some rule built into its structure concerning how long it may be disbanded and may be still
called the same club upon its reinstatement, however it is equally likely that the club has no such
rule and that, when asked, the members of the club wouldn’t give it a definitive answer. It would
seem then that there would be no real answer to the question “is this the same club.” And that
either claim concerning the status of the alleged club would be neither true nor false. Put more
simply, there is no fact of the matter concerning the correct status of the club, because both the
claim “this is the same club” and “this is a different club” are simply semantically different ways
of describing one and the same outcome. In much the same way, I believe there is something
indeterminate about the nature of our identity. Specifically, a self passing out of existence and
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being replaced by another, and the continued existence of a persistent and cohesive self are
simply semantically different ways of describing the same outcome. Because of our inability to
ever get outside of our own brains to examine selfhood objectively, we cannot know whether
there would be a perceptually significant difference in our lives if we existed as a bundle of
successive selves all connected by some kind of direct relation, or if we existed as a continually
coherent overarching and persistent self. However, as shown above, it logically makes more
sense to accept the former view. Whether or not there is a fact of the matter about the entity of
the self may not have a coherent answer, however the idea we have of some kind of selfhood is a
psychologically useful tool for helping us navigate our lives and our relationships with others.
Finally, the question of whether or not we would notice the death of one self and the “birth” of
another seems to be a somewhat indeterminate question, where there is no metaphysically
profound difference between the “life” or “death” of a self because both options are simply two
different ways of describing the same outcome.
V. Conclusions
As such, the concept of selfhood is one which is vitally important to us from a
psychological perspective because it is through the lens of the self that we view our world,
navigate our lives, and create our narrative stories. Despite the importance of the concept of “the
self,” because of the logical constraints we are faced with (namely our inability to obtain an
objective standpoint when regarding the concept of ourselves) we will never be able to
conclusively discover whether “selves” actually exist as things in themselves, I think it doubtful
that they do and find it more persuasive that the concept of selfhood is nothing more than a
psychological tendency. Despite this, the appearance of the self is something worth
investigating. As I hope to have shown in this paper, the intuitive idea we have of the self as a
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persistent and ever changing entity is actually not what matters when we are talking about our
vision of selfhood. Instead, it is logically more likely that we are a bundle of successive selves
connected by some direct relation, and it is actually the relation, rather than the unified
consciousness, which is important when we are discussing selves. Further, the difference
between the passing out of and passing into existence of a self, does not describe some deep
metaphysical difference but rather simply is two different ways of describing one and the same
outcome. Although at first disturbing, I believe this should give us a somewhat more optimistic
outlook upon the time when we pass out of existence entirely, because perhaps it will not be as
final as once thought, but rather a continuation of the cycle of selfhood, continued without a
physical vessel.
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